The exploitation of millions of colonial slave laborers was accepted as part of the given world by the very thinkers who proclaimed freedom to be man's natural state and inalienable right. Even when theoretical claims of freedom were transformed into revolutionary action on the political stage, it was possible for the slave-driven colonial economy that functioned behind the scenes to be kept in darkness.
If this paradox did not seem to trouble the logical consciousness of contemporaries, it is perhaps more surprising that present-day writers, while fully cognizant of the facts, are still capable of constructing Western histories as coherent narratives of human freedom. The reasons do not need to be intentional. When national histories are conceived as selfcontained, or when the separate aspects of history are treated in disciplinary isolation, counterevidence is pushed to the margins as irrelevant. The greater the specialization of knowledge, the more advanced the level of research, the longer and more venerable the scholarly tradition, the easier it is to ignore discordant facts. It should be noted that specialization and isolation are also a danger for those new disciplines such as African American studies, or new fields such as diaspora studies, that were established precisely to remedy the situation. Disciplinary boundaries allow counterevidence to belong to someone else's story. After all, a scholar cannot be an expert in everything. Reasonable enough. But such arguments are a way of avoiding the awkward truth that if certain constellations of facts are able to enter scholarly consciousness deeply enough, they threaten not only the venerable narratives, but also the entrenched academic disciplines that (re)produce them. For example, there is no place in the university in which the particular research constellation "Hegel and Haiti" would have a home. That is the topic which concerns me here, and I am going to take a circuitous route to reach it. My apologies, but this apparent detour is the argument itself.
non-Europeans and excesses of tobacco, sexuality, and other debaucheries that threatened to contaminate the Dutch domestically: "The stock visual and textual anthologies of native barbarism in Brazil and Florida, for example, featured Indians smoking through rolled leaves, while acts of copulation, cannibalism, public urination and other sorts of miscellaneous beastliness proceeded routinely in the background" (ER, p. 204).
Schama is happy simply to record without critical comment the magical fantasy of Thomas Mun, that under capitalism money begets money, as influencing the Dutch he is studying:
Capital begot capital with astonishing ease, and so far from denying themselves its fruits, capitalists reveled in the material comforts it bought. At midcentury there seemed no limit, certainly no geographical limit, to the range of its fleets and the resourcefulness of its entrepreneurs. No sooner was one consumer demand glutted or exhausted than another promising raw material was discovered, the supply monopolized, demand stimulated, markets exploited at home and abroad. Would the tide of prosperity ever ebb? [ER, p. 323] 9. Certainly Grotius discussed real slavery. But Grotius (see note 13) is cited by Schama only in other contexts (just wars, free trade, Dutch destiny, marriage, whales). It is not unreasonable to have suspicions that the silence is Schama's own. Such selective national histories have become a trend in European historiography, one that omits much or all of the colonizing story. of a Dutch husband and wife alone in a landscape, is included). Nor are there any other images of blacks.10 Of course, given the absence of slaves from Schama's written account, they would have been out of place in the illustrations. The consequence of this scholarship is partial blindness among seas of perspicacity, and it is characteristic of Western academic scholarship, as we shall see. 24. It was Montesquieu who brought slavery into the Enlightenment discussion and set the tone. While condemning the institution philosophically, he justified "Negro" slavery on pragmatic, climatic, and blatantly racist grounds ("flat noses," "black from head to foot," and lacking in "common sense"). Sala-Molins pronounces Rousseau's silence in the face of this evidence "racist" and "revolting" (CN, p. 253).30 Such outrage is unusual among scholars who, as professionals, are trained to avoid passionate judgements in their writing. This moral neutrality is built into the disciplinary methods that, while based on a variety of philosophical premises, result in the same exclusions. Today's intellectual historian who treats Rousseau in context will follow good professional form by relativizing the situation, judging (and excusing) Rousseau's racism by the mores of his time, in order to avoid thereby the fallacy of anachronism. Or, today's philosopher, who is trained to analyze theory totally abstracted from historical context, will attribute a universality to Rousseau's writings that transcends the author's own intent or personal limitations in order to avoid thereby the fallacy of reduction ad hominem. In both cases, the embarrassing facts are quietly allowed to disappear. They are visible, however, in general histories of the era, where they cannot help but be mentioned because when Enlightenment theory was put into practice, the perpetrators of political revolutions stumbled over the economic fact of slavery in ways that made their own acknowledgement of the contradiction impossible to avoid. 
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The colonial revolutionaries of America fighting for their independence against Britain mobilized Locke's political discourse to their ends. The metaphor of slavery was central to that struggle but in a new sense: "Americans genuinely believed that men who were taxed without their consent were literally slaves, since they had lost the power to resist oppression, and since defenselessness inevitably led to tyranny" (PSAR, p. 273). by Jaucourt was forceful: "Esclavage" declared slavery contrary to nature; "Liberte naturelle" accused religion of using its pretext against natural right because slaves were needed for the colonies, plantations, and mines; "Traite des Negres" declared slaves traded to be "illicit merchandise-prohibited by all the laws of humanity and equality," so that abolition was necessary even if it ruined the colonies: "Let the colonies be destroyed rather than be the cause of so much evil." But racism was still present in these texts (CN, pp. 254-61), and abolition was advised as a gradual process in order to prepare the slaves for freedom.
38. This slave conspiracy was led by Boukman, a priest of Vodou, a new syncretic cult that not only brought together slaves from diverse cultures of Africa, but included Western cultural symbols as well (see below, n. 114). Boukman addressed the slaves: "'Throw away the symbol of the god of the whites who has so often caused us to weep, and listen to the voice of liberty, which speaks in the hearts of us all"' (BJ, p. 87). In the German-language press, Minerva's coverage was special. Already in 1794, two years after its founding, it had established its reputation as the best of its genre of political journals. It strove to be nonpartisan, objective, and factual, aiming at "'historical truth'" that would be "'instructive ... Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes in his important book Silencing the Past that the Haitian Revolution "entered history with the peculiar characteristic of being unthinkable even as it happened." Of course he is correct to emphasize the incapacity of most contemporaries, given their ready-made categories, "to understand the ongoing revolution on its own terms" (SP, p. 73). But there is a danger in conflating two silences, the past and the present one, when it comes to the Haitian story. For if men and women in the eighteenth century did not think in nonracial terms of the "fundamental equality of humanity," as "some of us do today," at least they knew what was happening; today, when the Haitian slave revolution might be more thinkable, it is more invisible, due to the construction of disciplinary discourses through which knowledge of the past has been inherited (SP, The German word normally is Sklave; note that here, and throughout his work, Hegel uses both terms, Knecht and Sklav(e) in the dialectic of mutual recognition. But what if the "property" is itself the injurer, the slave who rectifies the injury to his person by asserting his own freedom without compensation? Hegel does not raise this question but moves, rather, to a discussion of the "customs" of "the people" (das Volk) and the common "work" of all. This takes him in a strikingly non-Hobbesean direction, to a critique of the stunting and repetitive work of modern factory labor (the division of labor, exemplified by Smith's pin factory); see pp. 227-28. Hegel then describes critically the uncontrolled and "blind" interdependence of laborers in the global economy, the "burgerliche Gesellschaft" of market exchange that forms a "monstrous system" (ungeheueres System) of mutual "dependency" (Abhangigkeit) and that "like a wild beast needs to be tamed" (pp. 229, 230). Fragment 22 ends (in 1804!) just at the point where Hegel's discussion of "possession" (Besitz), as the form in which the generality of "the thing" (das Ding) is "recognized" (anerkannt), would have led him to confront the contradiction that the law of private property treats the slave (whose existence is nothing but to labor) as a thing! The slave is the one commodity like no other, as freedom of property and freedom of person are here in direct contradiction. Is it for this reason that Hegel's manuscript breaks off suddenly? The revolt of the Hegel understands the position of the master in both political and economic terms. In the System der Sittlichkeit (1803): "The master is in possession of an overabundance of physical necessities generally, and the other [the slave] in the lack thereof."80 At first consideration the master's situation is "independent, and its essential nature is to be for itself"; whereas "the other," the slave's position, "is dependent, and its essence is life or existence for another."'8 The slave is characterized by the lack of recognition he receives. He is viewed as "a thing"; "thinghood" is the essence of slave consciousness-as it was the essence of his legal status under the Code Noir (PM, p. 235). But as the dialectic develops, the apparent dominance of the master reverses itself with his awareness that he is in fact totally dependent on the slave. One has only to collectivize the figure of the master in order to see the descriptive pertinence of Hegel's analysis: the slave-holding class is indeed totally dependent on the institution of slavery for the "overabundance" that constitutes its wealth. This class is thus incapable of being the agent of historical progress without annihilatslaves in Saint-Domingue, in this context, saved Hegel from the bad infinity (the "monstrous system") of contract reciprocity by providing the link (via a shift in emphasis from exchange to labor) from an economic system (the infinite system of needs) to politics: the founding, the context of continued pressure for the abolition of slavery, developments in Haiti, the "great experiment," were monitored continually, and they evoked increasing criticism even from Haiti's former supporters.'22 At issue was the alleged brutality of King Henri Christophe'23 and the island's decline in productivity under the system of free labor (here would be the proper moment for a Marxist critique). 124 We have no record as to whether these debates caused Hegel, as well, to reconsider Haiti's "great experiment." What is clear is that in an effort to become more erudite in African studies during the 1820s, Hegel was in fact becoming dumber. 
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Why is ending the silence on Hegel and Haiti important? Given Hegel's ultimate concession to slavery's continuance-moreover, given the fact that Hegel's philosophy of history has provided for two centuries a justification for the most complacent forms of Eurocentrism (Hegel was perhaps always a cultural racist if not a biological one)-why is it of more than arcane interest to retrieve from oblivion this fragment of history, the truth of which has managed to slip away from us?
There are many possible answers, but one is surely the potential for 
